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WHEN THE MUSIC STOPS, WHY NOT
REQUIRE CERTAIN TITLE VII PLAINTIFFS
TO FIND A CHAIR ON WHICH TO REST
THEIR COMPLAINT?
CATHERINE R. CAIFANO*
I.

INTRODUCTION

"If you puke on a piece of paper and sign it, you've satisfied notice
pleading."1
2

A. The Problem

Suppose that an individual has filed a lawsuit against their
former employer alleging gender discrimination. 3 As required by
law, prior to filing the lawsuit, the individual filed a charge of
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (hereinafter the "EEOC").4 The EEOC advised the
employer of the charge, and the employer prepared a response and
*Graduated from The John Marshall Law School on
January 18, 2009,
magna cum laude. Catherine is presently employed as an Associate with the
law firm of Robbins, Schwartz, Nicholas, Lifton & Taylor, Ltd. in Chicago,
Illinois. Catherine practices in the area of labor and employment law
representing Illinois educational institutions, local governments and private
employers.
I would like to thank my father, Richard B. Caifano, for teaching me to be
passionate about the law-you are a true role model and inspiration to all you
mentor. I would also like to thank my mother and sister for always believing
in me. A special thanks to my fianc6, Joseph F. Locallo III, for reading the
drafts of my Comment countless times, and for always offering guidance and
encouragement. I would also like to thank Judge Peter Flynn and the editors
and staff of The John Marshall Law Review for their insight and assistance.
Finally, I would not be where I am today without the support of Leonard
Amari-I am forever grateful to you, Leonard.
1. See Interview with Judge Peter Flynn, First District Circuit Court
Judge, Chancery Division, and Professor of Illinois Civil Procedure, The John
Marshall Law School, in Chicago, Illinois (Aug. 28, 2007) (recalling a quote by
his Civil Procedure professor, James WM. Moore).
2. This hypothetical was created by the author for illustrative purposes
only. To the best of the author's knowledge, this hypothetical has not been
used in any other publication.
3. See infra note 36 (listing other bases for asserting a claim of
discrimination in addition to "gender" discrimination).
4. See Infra note 45 (describing the procedure for filing a complaint and
receiving a response).
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participated in the EEOC's investigation 5 by answering a request
for documents, filing a response, and allowing interviews of its
employees. After its investigation, the EEOC concludes that there
was no reasonable cause to find a violation of the law and the
individual's charge is dismissed. 6 The employer believes the
process is over, but it is not. The individual requested and
received a "Right to Sue" letter from the EEOC and sued the
employer in federal court. 7 Now all the individual has to do is
satisfy the notice pleading requirement under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8,8 and the employer has to defend a lawsuit.
This Comment will address the disparity between an
individual's right to file a lawsuit after the EEOC has determined
that there has been no violation of the law, and the low threshold
of notice pleading in the federal courts. It will also examine the
dilemma of an employer having to decide whether to defend a
lawsuit through at least the pre-trial discovery process because of
the lenient pleading standard or to settle the case and pay an
undeserving plaintiff money in lieu of the expense of litigating the
case.
This Comment will propose that Federal Rule 8 be
supplemented by statute 9 to provide for a heightened pleading
standard (from notice pleading to fact pleading), specifically for,
and limited to, only those individuals who file lawsuits pursuant to
Title VII after the EEOC has dismissed their charge finding no
reasonable cause to support a violation of the law.

5. EEOC, EEOC Investigations - What an Employer Should Know,
http:lwww.eeoc.gov/employersinvestigations.html(last visited Aug. 27, 2007).
During the EEOC's investigation, the employer may be asked to submit a
statement of position; respond to a Request for Information by submitting
copies of personnel policies, the former employee's personnel files, the
personnel files of other individuals, and other information; permit an on-site
visit by the EEOC investigator; and provide contact information for or have
employees available for witness interviews. Id.
6. EEOC, EEOC's Charge Processing Procedures, http://www.eeoc.gov
charge/overviewcharge-processing.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2007).
7. Id. When a charge of discrimination is dismissed, a notice is issued in
accordance with the law, 42 U.S.C. § 2000, which gives the charging party
ninety days in which to file a lawsuit on his or her behalf. Id.
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). The portion of Rule 8 relevant to this Comment is:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short
and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction
depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs
no new ground of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and
(3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the
alternative or of several difference types may be demanded.
Id.
9. JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
8.04(b) (3d
ed. 1997); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2006) (stating that federal courts' rules
"shall be consistent with Acts of Congress").

2009]

Heightened PleadingStandard for Certain Title VII Plaintiffs

507

B. The Reasons for "The Problem"

In order to understand the reasons for "the problem," this
Comment will first explore the Federal Rules, specifically Rule 8,
and the distinction between notice pleading and fact pleading
(which is required by some states, including Illinois). After
examining the Federal Rules, this Comment will survey the
history and policy reasons behind the enactment of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The next focal point of this Comment will
be the EEOC, the laws it enforces, the charge filing and
investigation process, what employers are required to do, and the
infamous "Right to Sue" letter. This Comment will then address
the U.S. Supreme Court's position that there should be no
heightened pleading standard for civil rights cases. Finally, it will
review the law which allows an individual to file a lawsuit after
the EEOC has dismissed a charge of discrimination.
1.

The History of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure

a. Scope and Purpose of the Rules
At common law, to come before a royal court, the aggrieved
party had to first obtain a writ from the king, which conferred
jurisdiction on a particular court. 10 The parties were then
required to exchange pleadings that narrowed the issue before the
court to a single question of law or fact.11 This process prompted
the first major procedural reform, the Field Code, which was
promulgated in 1848.12 Field Code pleading required plaintiffs to
plead facts supporting each and every element of their claim
before discovery without access to materials necessary to do so. 1 3
But further change was needed.
In response to the continued need for change, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter the "Rules") were
promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act in 1938.14 The
10. Elizabeth Roseman, Comment, A Phoenix from the Ashes? Heightened
Pleading Requirements in Disparate Impact Cases, 36 SETON HALL L. REV.
1043, 1046 (2006) (citing GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN,
UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE 45[A] (3d ed. 2002)).
11. See id. (citing BARBARA A. BABCOCK & TONI M. MASSARO, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 272 (2d ed. 2001)).
12. See id. (citing Act of Apr. 8, 1847, ch. 59, 8, 1848 N.Y. Laws 66, 67-68);
see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 341 (3d ed.
2005) (stating that adoption of Field Code "meant the end of all special
pleading, forms of action and writs, the closing of the chasm between equity
and law, the destruction of one blow of the paraphernalia of this most
recondite, most precious, most lawerly area of law").
13. See Roseman, supra note 10, at 1047 (citing Act of Apr. 12, ch. 379,
120(2), 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 521).
14. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (1934) (giving the Supreme Court power to
prescribe "general rules of practice and procedure" and "rules of evidence" for
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Rules govern procedure in the U.S. District Courts in all suits of a
civil nature, and have been revised numerous times. 15 Guidelines
have been established for construction of the Rules by the federal
courts. 16
"Congress has the general power to regulate courts and...
17
specific power to authorize the imposition of sanctions."'
Congress can, and has, enacted Rules of Practice and Procedure of
8
Evidence directly.'
b.

Welcome to Notice Pleading: Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8

Among other things, Rule 8 sets forth the general rules of
pleading claims for relief in federal court. 19 Pleadings must
contain only a short and plain statement sufficient to give notice to
the defendant. 20 "Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies
to all civil actions, with limited exceptions." 21
Additionally,
"pleadings shall be construed so as to do justice." 22
Federal Rule 8 is "fashioned in the interest of fair and
reasonable notice, not technicality." 23 A complaint satisfies notice
pleading if it "outlines the law claimed to be violated and connects
defendants with the alleged violation." 24 This simplified notice
cases in the U.S. district courts and court of appeals).

15. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. "These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions
and proceedings in the U.S. district courts, except as stated in Rule 81." Id.
16. "They shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action." Id. The Rules shall also be
construed to created a uniform system of procedure, to favor decisions on the
merits of a case, and to eliminate "the sporting" theory of justice. MOORE ET
AL., supra note 9, 121(1)(a), (c).
17. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1992) (referring to the
variety of circumstances where sanctions can be imposed); see U.S. CONST. art.
I § 8, cl. 1 and 18 (authorizing Congress to establish federal courts); see also
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 18 (authorizing Congress to "make all laws necessary
and proper to establish those courts").
18. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 9,
1.04(1)(d) (referring to the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
320935, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
19. See supra note 8 (explaining the requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)).
20. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (standing for the
proposition that the illustrative forms appended to the Rules plainly
demonstrate that the Rules do not require a complainant to set out in detail
the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require
is "a short and plain statement of the claim" that will give the defendant fair
notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests).
21. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (holding that FED.
R. Civ. P. 8(a) applies to all civil actions unless specified in other rules, under
maxim "[e]xpressio unius est exclusio alterius").
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e) (describing how federal courts construe
pleadings).
23. MOORE ET AL., supra note 9, 8.04(1)(a).
24. See id. (referencing the Court's decision in Brownlee v. Conine, 957 F.2d
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pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules 25 and summary
judgment motions 26 to define disputed facts and issues and to
dispose of unmeritorious claims. 27 Rule 8 is subject to Rule 11.28
29
2. Show Me Your Facts

Under fact pleading, a claimant must plead the cause of
action, the elements of the claim and facts to support the cause of
action. 30 Under fact pleading, a judge determines up front
whether the claimant has pled enough facts to present the case to
3
a jury. '
There is a significant difference between what a claimant is
required to plead in state court versus federal court. It is the
position of the federal courts that detailed information about a
32
claim is gained through discovery and other procedures.
However, state courts also have rules regarding the discovery
process and summary judgment. 33 Fact pleading draws a line at
the beginning of the case (immediate dismissal) rather than at the

353, 354 (7th Cir. 1992), which held that a "conclusory" complaint is "not
automatically fatal").
25. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (stating that any relevant, non-privileged
matter is subject to discovery).
26. See FED. R. C1V. P. 56(a)-(b) (stating that either party can move for
summary judgment at any time, but that a plaintiff must wait for twenty days
to expire after commencing the lawsuit).
27. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512-13.
28. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (stating generally that when an attorney or
unrepresented party presents a pleading to the court, he is certifying that to
the best of the person's knowledge, information and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, the allegations and other facts
have evidentiary support or will likely be supported by evidence after further
investigation). If not, the attorney or unrepresented party may be subject to
sanctions. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
29. The State of Illinois will be used as an example of how fact pleading
works.
30. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-603 (2007).
31. Judge Peter Flynn, Lecture at The John Marshall Law School, Illinois
Civil Procedure class (Aug. 25, 2007). The "cause of action" is the legal
construction of the dispute, the "elements of the claim" are like the bones of a
skeleton, and the "facts to support the cause of action" are like the flesh of the
skeleton. Id. Judge Flynn further informed the class that a claimant needs
enough facts to say to the judge that if I prove all of these facts, I should get to
the jury, and the more complicated the cause of action, the more facts a
claimant will be required to plead. Id. If the claimant has not pled enough
facts, everyone should go home. Id.
32. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512-13.
33. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1003(a)(2007) (stating that all discovery
shall be in accordance with the rules); see also 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21005(b)-(c)(2007)
(stating that a defendant may move for a summary
judgment in his or her favor as to all or any part of the complaint and
judgment shall be entered in his favor if there is no genuine issue of material
fact).
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middle (summary judgment) or end (jury or bench trial) as in
federal court.
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter the "Act")
prohibits discrimination in the workplace by employers against
any employee. 3 4 Under Title VII, it is illegal to discriminate in any
aspect of employment. 35 Among others, discriminatory practices
include harassment and retaliation. 36 Title VII also protects
against an unlawful employment practice based on disparate
37
impact.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964). The relevant portion of this Section
states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....

Id.
Under the Act, the term "employee" is defined as:
an individual employed by an employer, except that the term "employee"
shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or
political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any
person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an
appointee on the policy making level or an immediate advisor with
respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of office....
Id. at 2000e(o. The term "employer" is defined as "a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person ....
Id. at 2000e(b).
35. Aspects of employment include: hiring and firing; compensation,
assignment, or classification of employees; transfer, promotion, layoff, or
recall; job advertisements; recruiting; testing; use of company facilities;
training and apprenticeship programs; fringe benefits; pay, retirement plans,
and disability leave; or other terms and conditions of employment. EEOC,
Discriminatory Practices, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/overview-practices
.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2007).
36. See id. (including: harassment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, disability, or age; retaliation against an individual for filing a
charge of discrimination, participating in an investigation, or opposing
discriminatory practices; employment decisions based on stereotypes or
assumptions about the abilities, traits, or performance of individuals of a
certain sex, race, age, religion, or ethnic group, or individuals with disabilities;
and denying employment opportunities to a person because of marriage to, or
association with, an individual of a particular race, religion, national origin, or
an individual with a disability. Title VII also prohibits discrimination because
of participation in schools or places of worship associated with a particular
racial, ethnic, or religious group).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2006).
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under [Title VII] only if a complaining party demonstrates
that a [employer] uses a particular employment practice that causes a
disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
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Title VII created the agency known as the EEOC.38 Congress
intended the EEOC to be "the lead enforcement agency in the area
of workplace discrimination." 39 The EEOC is empowered to
prevent any person from engaging in any unlawful employment
practice. 40 Title VII dictates that all laws enforced by the EEOC
require the filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
before filing a private lawsuit. 41 It further prescribes that the
42
EEOC is responsible for processing the charge.
4. Proceed Directly to the EEOC (If You Pass Go, Do Not
3
Collect $200)4
The EEOC is the regulatory body charged with enforcing Title
VII. 44 The EEOC's job begins once an individual files a charge of
45
discrimination (hereinafter the "Charge") with its office.
Between FY 2001 and FY 2006, the EEOC received, on average,
58,437 Title VII Charges per year. 46 After the Charge has been
origin and the [employer] fails to demonstrate that the challenged
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity; or the complaining party makes the demonstration.
. . [of] an alternative employment practice and the [employer] refuses to
adopt [it].
Id.
38. Id. § 2000e-4. The EEOC has become a respected advocate for the
communities it was created principally to serve. EEOC, Pre 1965: Events
Leading to the Creation of EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/pre1965
/index.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2007). Those communities include all people
of the nation because discrimination can occur to anyone of any race, color,
"EEOC
religion, national origin, age, disability, and of either sex. Id.
recognizes that as an agency of the government, it has a role of fairness not
only to those protected classes whose forebears helped forge the alliances that
resulted in the passage of civil rights legislation, but also to the employers and
unions that are subject to EEOC jurisdiction." Id.
39. Id.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006).
41. Id. § 2000e-5(f(1).
42. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
43. A reference to the game of MONOPOLY, Parker Brothers (1935).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4.
Discrimination,
Employment
of
a
Charge
Filing
45. EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/overviewchargejiling.html (last visited Aug. 27,
2007). Any individual who believes that his or her employment rights have
been violated may file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Id.
Generally, a charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days from the
date of the alleged violation. Id. However, the 180-day filing deadline is
extended to 300 days if the charge is also covered by a state or local antidiscrimination law. Id. In order to file a charge, an individual must provide
his/her name, address, and telephone number; the name, address and
telephone number of his/her employer that is alleged to have engaged in
discrimination, and the number of employees, if known; a short description of
the alleged violation(s); and the date(s) of the alleged violation(s). Id.
46. EEOC, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges,
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats.vii.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2007). During FY
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filed and the employer has been notified, 47 Title VII requires the
EEOC to investigate the Charge to determine whether there is
reasonable cause to believe that the statute was violated. 48 Title
49
VII provides that the EEOC's investigation can be broad.
The EEOC has discretion to handle the processing of a
Charge in a number of ways before issuing some form of
resolution. 50 The EEOC assesses whether there is "reasonable
cause" to believe that the Charge is true 51 by examining whether
the evidence "establishes under the appropriate legal theory, a
prima facie case, whether the employer has provided a viable
defense, and whether there is evidence of pretext."5 2 Between FY
2001 and FY 2006, the EEOC made a "reasonable cause"
53
If
determination seven percent of the time on average per year.

2001, the EEOC received a total of 59,631 Title VII charges of discrimination.
Id. During FY 2002, the EEOC received a total of 61,459 Title VII charges of
discrimination. Id. During FY 2003, the EEOC received a total of 59,075 Title
VII charges of discrimination. Id. During FY 2004, the EEOC received 58,328
Title VII charges of discrimination. Id. During FY 2005, the EEOC received
55,976 Title VII charges of discrimination. Id. During FY 2006, the EEOC
received 56,155 Title VII charges of discrimination. Id.
47. EEOC, supra note 6.
48. See 3-82 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAw § 82.02 (MB 2005) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) and EEOC v. Michael Constr. Co., 706 F.2d 244, 248 (8th
Cir. 1983)).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a); see, e.g., EEOC, supra note 6 (stating that the
EEOC has the right to make written requests for information, interview
people, review documents, and visit the facility where the alleged
discrimination occurred).
50. See, e.g., EEOC, supra note 6 (providing that the EEOC may assign a
charge for priority investigation if the initial facts appear to support a
violation of the law). The EEOC can seek to settle a charge. Id. A charge'
may also be dismissed at any point if, in the agency's best judgment, further
investigation will not establish a violation of the law. Id. When a charge is
dismissed, a notice is issued in accordance with the law which gives the
charging party ninety days in which to file suit. Id.
51. 42
U.S.C.
§
2000e-5(b);
EEOC,
Definition
of
Terms,
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/define.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2007).
52. EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) § 40.2.
53. EEOC, supra note 46. During FY 2001, the EEOC made a reasonable
cause determination 5,014 times out of the 59,631 total charges received, or
nine percent of the time on average. Id. During FY 2002, the EEOC made a
reasonable cause determination 4,380 times out of the 61,459 total charges
received, or eight percent of the time on average. Id. During FY 2003, the
EEOC made a reasonable cause determination 3,181 times out of the 59,075
total charges received, or six percent of the time on average. Id. During FY
2004, the EEOC made a reasonable cause determination 2,630 times out of the
59,631 total charges received, or five percent of the time on average. Id.
During FY 2005, the EEOC made a reasonable cause determination 2,890
times out of the 59,631 total charges received, or six percent of the time on
average. Id. During FY 2006, the EEOC made a reasonable cause
determination 2,426 times out of the 59,631 total charges received, or six
percent of the time on average. Id.
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there is reasonable cause, the EEOC may file suit on an
individual's behalf or decide to close its case and issue a "Right to
Sue" letter upon request. 54 It is important to note that if the
EEOC does not find "reasonable cause," the charging party can
still file a lawsuit in federal court. 55 Between FY 2001 and FY
2006, the EEOC made a "no reasonable cause" determination
sixty-one percent of the time on average per year. 56 If there is no
reasonable cause, the charging party simply requests a "Right to
Sue" letter from the EEOC.57 No action alleging a violation of
Title VII may be brought unless the alleged discrimination has
5s
been made the subject of a Charge.
5.

The Supremes Have Spoken: We Will Not Raise the Bar

If the EEOC did not find reasonable cause to support a
violation of Title VII, why should a court or jury hear the case?
The U.S. Supreme Court has answered this seemingly logical
question. An employer's argument that an EEOC determination
of "no reasonable cause" should create a bar to filing a lawsuit has
59
been rejected by the courts.
In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, the U.S. Supreme Court granted
writ of certiorari to review a judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, which affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs
employment discrimination claim against his employer because
the employee's complaint did not allege facts constituting a prima
60
facie case of discrimination under the burden shifting method of
54. See EEOC, supra note 6 (stating that before filing suit or issuing a
"Right to Sue" letter, the EEOC will first attempt to conciliate the case).
55. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973).
56. EEOC, supra note 46. During FY 2001, the EEOC found no reasonable
cause in 32,075 charges of the 59,631 total charges received, or fifty-nine
percent of the time on average. Id. During FY 2002, the EEOC found no
reasonable cause in 34,671 charges of the 61,459 total charges received, or
sixty-one percent of the time on average. Id. During FY 2003, the EEOC
found no reasonable cause in 32,418 charges of the 59,075 total charges
received, or sixty-two percent of the time on average. Id. During FY 2004, the
EEOC found no reasonable cause in 32,646 charges of the 58,328 total charges
received, or sixty-four percent of the time on average. Id. During FY 2005,
the EEOC found no reasonable cause in 29,344 charges of the 55,976 total
charges received, or sixty-three percent of the time on average. Id. During FY
2006, the EEOC found no reasonable cause in 27,178 charges of the 56,155
total charges received, or sixty-one percent of the time on average. Id.
57. EEOC, supra note 6.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
59. See Fekete v. U.S. Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331, 336 (9th Cir. 1970)
(holding that Congress' intent in enacting Title VII was to outlaw unlawful
employment practices; to require an aggrieved person to first resort to the
EEOC's processes before filing suit; and after an aggrieved person satisfies the
statutory requirement of first resorting to the EEOC, he has the right to a
judicial determination as to whether he has been the victim of a violation).
60. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 800 (describing the burden
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McDonnell Douglas.61 The respondent-employer in Swierkiewicz
argued that plaintiffs complaint merely stated conclusory
allegations and that allowing lawsuits based on conclusory
allegations of discrimination to go forward would burden the
courts
and encourage disgruntled
employees
to bring
The U.S. Supreme Court said
unsubstantiated lawsuits. 62
"whatever the practical merits of this (respondent's) argument, the
Federal Rules do not contain a heightened pleading standard for
employment discrimination suits."6 3 The federal circuits have
64
followed the Supreme Court's holding in Swierkiewicz.
The Supreme Court in Swierkiewicz recognized the "practical
merit" of respondent's argument.6 5 Such practical merit could be

shifting framework as follows: A plaintiff must first show (1) membership in a
protected group, (2) qualification for the job in question, (3) an adverse
employment action, and (4) circumstances supporting an inference of
discrimination).
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden then shifts to the defendant to establish a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id.
at 801. Then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the
defendant's proffered reason is pretext for discrimination. Id.
61. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 506. The plaintiff was a native of Hungary
and fifty-three years of age. Id. He filed a lawsuit against his former
employer claiming that he was fired based on his national origin in violation of
Title VII and his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967. Id.
Prior to filing the lawsuit, plaintiff filed a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC, and the EEOC's investigation resulted in a
dismissal of the charge. Brief for Respondent at 32, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema,
No. 00-1853 (U.S. Feb. 2, 2002), 2002 WL 384241.
62. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514; Brief for Respondent, supra note 61, at
34-40.
63. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514-15 (answering the question of
whether a complaint must contain factual allegations establishing each of the
elements of a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas
Corp.). The Supreme Court held that the prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas Corp. was an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement. Id.
at 506. The Supreme Court further stated that Swierkiewicz's complaint
satisfied Rule 8 because it gave the employer fair notice of the basis for the
claim. Id.
64. Gregory v. Dillard's Inc., 494 F.3d 694, 710 (8th Cir. 2007); Amron, et
al. v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Advisors Inc., 464 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2006); Moore v.
Greenwood Sch. Dist. No. 52, 195 F. App'x. 140 (4th Cir. 2006); Kolupa v.
Roselle Park Dist., 438 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2006); Waters v. Home Depot,
U.S.A., Inc., 159 F. App'x. 943 (11th Cir. 2005); Maduka, M.D., v. Sunrise
Hosp., 375 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2004); Educadores Puertorriquenos En Accion, v.
Cesar Rey Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2004); Pringle v. Am. Red Cross,
79 F. App'x. 184 (6th Cir. 2003); Gavura v. Pa. State House of Representatives,
et al., 55 F. App'x 60 (3d Cir. 2002); Bookman v. Royal Ambulance Serv., Inc.,
3:06-CV-0632-M, 2006 WL 2506980, at *3 (N.D. Tex Aug. 16, 2006); Benham
v. Rice, No. 03-01127, 2005 WL 691871, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2005); Sheets v.
CTS Wireless Components, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D.N.M. 2002).
65. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515.
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related to the number of civil rights related complaints filed with
66
the U.S. District Courts.
II. ANALYSIS
The current state of Federal Rule 8 affects parties to Title VII
litigation differently if a plaintiffs Charge was dismissed by the
EEOC. In order to fully comprehend the effects, it is necessary to
compare and contrast Federal Rule 8 as viewed by plaintiffs and
defendants in a Title VII litigation setting, and then examine the
connection to Federal Rule 11. It is also important to review the
U.S. District Court's judicial caseload docket. In addition, it is
necessary to assess statistics that show that an adverse
employment action does not always constitute unlawful
discrimination. An exploration of the procedures under the Illinois
Human Rights Act (hereinafter "IHRA") is important as well.
Central to comprehending these effects, is research that suggests
that Title VII enables the "professional plaintiff."67 Furthermore,
other areas of the law have attempted to thwart abuse of the
judicial system once it is recognized.
A.

The FederalRules as Viewed by Plaintiffs and Defendants

Rule 8 simply requires a plaintiff to plead a short and plain
statement of the claim. 68 The U.S. Supreme Court has determined
that a pleading under Rule 8 must provide the defendant with
"fair" notice.6 9 What constitutes "fair" notice depends on which

66. Judicial
Caseload
Profile
Report,
http://www.uscourts.gov/cgibin/cmsd.pl (last visited Sept. 5, 2007). In 2001, there were 40,910 civil rights
cases filed in all district courts. Id. In 2002, there were 40,420 civil rights
cases filed in all district courts. Id. In 2003, there were 40,516 civil rights
cases filed in all district courts. Id. In 2004, there were 40,239 civil rights
cases filed in all district courts. Id. In 2005, there were 36,096 cases filed in
all district courts. Id. In 2006, there were 32,865 cases filed in all district
courts. Id.
67. See infra Part II.E (describing how a "professional plaintiff' can
manipulate Title VII).
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 8.
69. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513 (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, for the
proposition that a complaint need only "give the defendant fair notice of what
the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."). The question of
what constitutes "fair" notice has been answered by the federal appellate
courts. For example, the Second Circuit has held that a complaint must
contain enough information for a defendant to have a fair understanding of
what the plaintiff is complaining about and to know whether there is a legal
basis for recovery. Kittay v. Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 541 (2d Cir. 2000). The
Third Circuit has determined that a plaintiff will not be thrown out of court
for lack of detailed facts. In re Tower Air, Inc., 416 F.3d 229, 236-38 (3d Cir.
2005). The Fourth Circuit found that a complaint is sufficient as long as it
provides enough information to allow a defendant to answer; a complaint does
not need to provide all information necessary for a defendant to prepare a
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side of the "v" you are on. 70
1.

Perspectives on "FairNotice". An Examination of
71
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema

In Swierkiewicz, the defendant argued that plaintiffs
complaint did not satisfy Rule 8 because it only offered conclusory
allegations and did not reference any specific facts. 72 Essentially,
the defendant argued that the complaint must show some
inference of discrimination in order to survive a motion to
dismiss. 7 3 Plaintiffs position, and ultimately that of the U.S.
Supreme Court, was that the complaint gave "fair" notice to
defendant because it detailed the events leading to his
termination, provided relevant dates, and included the ages and

defense. Chao v. Rivendell Woods, Inc., 415 F.3d 342, 346-49 (4th Cir. 2005).
In GE Capital Corp. v. Posey, 415 F.3d 391, 395-97 (5th Cir. 2005), the court
determined that a complaint was sufficient to state a claim under the more
lenient notice pleading rules even though it did not contain separate
allegations as to each element and contained allegations that could be
characterized as conclusory. The Seventh Circuit has determined that a
complaint was sufficient to put the defendant on notice even though it
contained superfluous matter. Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc., 269 F.3d 818, 819-21
(7th Cir. 2001). The Eleventh Circuit's position is that plaintiffs do not have
to plead with great specificity. In re Se. Banking Corp., 69 F.3d 1539, 1551
(11th Cir. 1995).
70. For example, in terms of a typical case caption: John Doe, Plaintiff v.
Jane Doe Corporation, Defendant, the plaintiff appears on one side of the "v"
and the defendant appears on the other side.
71. 534 U.S. 506. The trial court's decision to dismiss plaintiffs complaint
because it did not state a prima facie case of discrimination was affirmed by
the appellate court. Id. However, on February 26, 2002, the Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the appellate court. Id. The case was returned to the
trial court, where a stipulated order to dismiss was entered on Oct. 21, 2002.
Civil Docket for Case No. 1:99-cv-12272-LAP (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2002).
Apparently, the parties ended up resolving this matter out of court.
72. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 61, at 1-3, 10-12 (identifying the
allegations contained in plaintiffs complaint: Defendant was a New Yorkbased reinsurance company. Plaintiff, a forty-two year old of Hungarian
descent, was hired by the defendant in April 1989 as a senior vice president.
At the time, defendant's chief executive officer, Chavel, was a French national
of the same age. In February 1995, plaintiff alleged that Chavel made
changes that affected his job duties. Chavel had stated that he wanted to
"energize" the underwriting department. In April 1997, plaintiff sent a memo
to Chavel. The memo outlined his grievances with the company and also
demanded a severance package. The memo made no reference to complaints
about discrimination based on his age or national origin. After sending the
memo and meeting with Chavel, plaintiff chose to be terminated instead of
resigning. In July 1997, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC, and in August 1999, he filed this action for national origin
discrimination under Title VII and for age discrimination under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 in connection with the termination

of his employment).
73. Brief for Respondent, supra note 61, at 5.
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nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons involved with
74
his termination.
2. DebatingFederalRule 8 from the Perspective of Opposing
Parties
Consider for a moment a fight between young siblings and the
parent saying to one sibling after "tattling" on the other sibling:
"There are two sides to every story."
a.

75
It Isn't Broken so You Have Nothing to Fix

The Federal "notice" pleading standard does not require the
pleading of "facts" or "causes of action." 76 Moreover, the U.S.
Supreme Court has rejected the idea that courts should measure a
pleading's adequacy by the elements of a claim.7 7 This simplified
notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and
summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues
78
and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.
The federal rules favor a decision on the merits rather than
procedure.7 9 Courts rely on the uniformity of the federal rules as
applied to all civil cases.8 0 Also, if the Title VII action is filed pro
se, the federal courts construe pro se complaints liberally.8 1
Finally, why make the problem introduced herein a pleading
problem? If anything, the focus should be on the EEOC, its
s
procedures and Title VII. 2
b.

Rule 8 Calls for Factual Information and Title VII
Plaintiffs Have Access to Facts

In 1952, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
rejected an amendment to Rule 8 to require plaintiffs to plead
8 3
facts on the basis that it was unnecessary.
74. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514.
75. The voice of supporters of the federal "notice" pleading standard
regarding claims brought under Title VII.
76. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944).
77. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515.
78. Id. at 512-13.
79. MOORE ET AL., supra note 9,

1.21 (1)(c); Schiavone v. Fortune, 477

U.S. 21, 27 (1986).
80. MOORE ET AL., supra note 9,

1.21 (1)(a).

So, one could argue that a

change to one category of civil actions would work against this purpose.
81. See id. § 8.04 (6) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980)). A pro
se complaint should be held to a less stringent standard because the federal
courts already construe a pro se litigant's pleadings liberally. Id.
82. Question posed to the author by Judge Peter Flynn on Aug. 28, 2007.
83. Brief for Respondent, supra note 61, at 11. The amendment would have
added to the "short and plain statement of the claim," a requirement that it
"contain facts constituting a cause of action." Id. The Advisory Committee
explained that the rule already requires the pleader to disclose adequate
information as to the basis of his claim for relief as distinguished from a bare
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The purpose in allowing a simplified pleading standard is
dependent upon a liberal discovery procedure.8 4 However, in
federal discrimination cases, detailed information has already
been provided to the EEOC, so specific facts are available to a
Title VII plaintiff at the pleading stage.8 5 Thus, a Title VII
plaintiff has access to facts to show an inference of discrimination,
and it would not be an unfair burden to plead facts that show that
a plaintiff is entitled to relief.8 6 This would resolve the issue of
87
"fair" notice for purposes of discrimination cases.
3.

The Rule 11 Connection

Rule 11 is applicable to any paper filed with the court.88 This
Rule requires an inquiry by the pleader as to the allegations
contained in the pleading.
Title VII requires the filing of a charge of discrimination with
the EEOC before filing a lawsuit.8 9 If the EEOC has the
opportunity to investigate, its findings would be the reasonable
inquiry under the circumstances. After all, the EEOC is charged
with the power to enforce Title VII. 90 If the EEOC makes a finding
of "no reasonable cause," what rationale does a plaintiff have for
filing a lawsuit based on the same information without more
averment that he wants relief and is entitled to it. Id. at 11-12.
84. See FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(1) (maintaining that relevant, non-privileged
materials must be submitted for discovery).
85. EEOC, supra note 45; see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 61, at 6
(discussing the type of information provided to the EEOC at the charge
processing and investigation stages).
86. The allegations of a complaint must indicate some probability that the
transaction, if it occurred as stated, supports a right to relief. Jack B.
Weinstein & Daniel H. Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform, 57 COLUM.
L. REV. 518, 523 (1957).
87. A Title VII plaintiff has to show that he/she is a member of a protected
class and that he/she has suffered an adverse employment action because of
his membership in a protected class.
EEOC, supra notes 35 and 36. For
example, if I were to plead a complaint for sex discrimination, I could state:
Plaintiff is a female. A female is protected from sex discrimination under Title
VII. EEOC, supra note 36. On October 6, 2007, Plaintiff was fired from her
job and a male is now employed in her position. Id. Plaintiffs employer
discriminated against her because of her sex. Id.
This complaint is an
example of conclusory allegations. Id. Now, if a plaintiff were required to
plead facts in the complaint to infer discrimination, a defendant-employer
would not have to defend this complaint because it would not survive a motion
to dismiss. Id. If a plaintiff wanted to survive a motion to dismiss, she would
have to plead facts to show the court that the defendant has received fair
notice because plaintiff pled facts in her complaint to support her cause of
action and to show that she is entitled to relief. Id.
88. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (maintaining that an attorney or unrepresented
party may be subject to sanctions if the person certifies pleadings that are not
supported by evidence).
89. EEOC, supra note 45.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4.
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evidence of discrimination or facts to support a prima facie case for
discrimination? A technical reading of Rule 11 would find that the
plaintiff does not have a basis for asserting a claim under Title
VII. However, if the EEOC makes a reasonable finding, then the
plaintiff has more than satisfied the reasonable inquiry
requirement and can include facts as determined by the EEOC in
its complaint to put the defendant on notice of the complaint and
the right to relief.
B. The Congestion of the U.S. District Court Judicial
CaseloadDocket
There is no doubt that "discrimination is odious but a
frivolous or malicious charge of such conduct ... is at least equally
obnoxious." 91

The filing of civil rights related cases rose significantly
between 1990 and 2000.92 The most recent statistics show that
civil rights related cases make up about eight percent of the total
civil filings in the U.S. District Courts. 93 In addition, recent
statistics evidence that the total number of civil rights related case
filings is second only to prisoner petitions. 94 Federal district
courts that deal with discrimination cases on a regular basis
recognize that anti-discrimination laws are frequently misused by
disgruntled employees. 95 Logically, this results in over burdened

91. Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722, 728 (2d Cir. 1976).
92. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 61, at 35 (citing the U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report: Civil Rights Complaints
in U.S. District Courts, 1990-1998, Fig. 1 (Jan. 2000, updated Dec. 12, 2001)).
Civil rights cases have increased from nine percent in 1990 to sixteen percent
in 2000. Id. Of this increase, fifty-seven percent of the cases were related to
employment issues. Id.
93. Judicial
Caseload
Profile
Report,
http://www.uscourts.gov/cgibinlcmsd2006.pl (last visited Sept. 5, 2007).
94. See id. (listing types of civil code filing in addition to prisoner petitions
and civil rights cases: "social security," "recovery of overpayments and
enforcement of judgment," "forfeitures and penalties and tax suits," "real
property," "labor suits," "contracts," "torts," "copyright, patent, and
trademark," "antitrust," and "all other civil").
95. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 61, at 35-36 (referring to the
District Court Judge's statement in Cicero v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc., 163 F.
Supp. 2d 743, 751-52 (E.D. Mich. 2001):
If a terminated employee wishes to file a discrimination lawsuit, he
must have rational reasons that could reasonably support a conclusion
that he was a member of a protected class, not just dissatisfaction at
being fired, confusion as to the reason, and a hope that discovery will
pull something out of the water that could be "spun" as evidence of
invidious discrimination. The anti-discrimination laws exist for the
important but narrow purpose of preventing employment decisions from
being made on the basis of mindless prejudice against irrelevant and
immutable characteristics, such as race, gender, and age. They do not
exist to provide an alternative means of unemployment compensation, to
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federal courts.
C. An Adverse Employment Action Does Not Always Equal
Discrimination
Under Title VII, an adverse employment action is defined as
an action taken by an employer that has an effect on terms and
conditions of employment. 96 The act of an employer taking an
adverse employment action against an employee is not always for
an illegal purpose, 97 and statistics show that the overall rate of
98
overturn of employees can be high.
On average, between FY 2001 and FY 2006, the EEOC
dismissed sixty-one percent of the Title VII charges filed with its
agency based on a "no reasonable cause" finding.99 Hence, the
EEOC's own statistics prove that not every adverse employment
action constitutes discrimination. Yet, the complaining party still
gets another bite at the apple after requesting a "Right to Sue"
letter from the EEOC.100

require employers to treat members of protected classes differently than
other employees, or to effect transfers of wealth to the legal profession
and disgruntled former employees).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(1)(a). Some examples of adverse employment
actions include termination of employment, demotion, transfer to a different
job with significantly different responsibilities, or significant change in
benefits. Id.
97. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-03 (holding that
employer may articulate some nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's
rejection).
98. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table 9: Layoffs and DischargesLevels
and Rates by Industry and Region, Not Seasonally Adjusted,
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/jolts.t09.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2007)
(listing the preliminary number of layoffs and discharges in both private
industry and government as 1,800 for the month of August 2007). For the
month of July 2007, the number of layoffs and discharges totaled 1,471. Id.
For the month of August 2006, the number of layoffs and discharges totaled
1,626). Id.
99. EEOC, supra note 46.
100. In FY 2001, the number of Right to Sue letters issued by the EEOC at
complaining party's request totaled 12,063. Letter from Stephanie D. Garner,
EEOC, to Catherine R. Caifano, J. MARSHALL L. REV. (Sept. 4, 2007) (outlining
charges resolved by EEOC where notice of Rights to Sue (NRTS) could have
been issued, Oct. 1, 2000 through Sept. 30, 2006) (on file with author). In FY
2002, the EEOC issued 12,503 Right to Sue letters upon request. Id. In FY
2003, the number of Right to Sue letter issued upon request totaled 8,742. Id.
That number declined in FY 2004 to 8,533 and decreased again to 7,073 in FY
2005. Id. In FY 2006, the number of Right to Sue letters issued upon request
totaled 6,811. Id.
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D. The State's Anti-DiscriminationEquivalent to Title VII
and Why Its Process Makes Senseol
The Illinois Department of Human Rights (hereinafter
"IDHR") is charged with enforcing the IHRA.1 2 Similar to the
EEOC's role in the federal context, the IDHR intakes and
investigates charges of discrimination.'0 3 Recently, the IHRA was
amended to provide an aggrieved individual with the opportunity
to bring an action in circuit court. 0 4 This opportunity is also
available to those individuals whose charge is dismissed by the
10 5
IDHR based on a determination of "no substantial evidence."'
Unlike Title VII, if a charge filed under the IDHR is dismissed,
there is a reviewing body where a complainant can go for a second
opinion or to file suit. 10 6
Illinois is a fact-pleading state. 10 7 While this amendatory act
appears to broaden a complainant's rights, it also prevents an
unmeritorious lawsuit from continuing beyond a motion to
dismiss. 0 8
Without taking away a complainant's rights, an

101. IHRA, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7A-101 to 104 will be used as an
example.
102. IDHR, Charge Processing, http://www.state.il.us/Charges/Chargel.htm
(last visited Oct. 30, 2007). The IHRA prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, citizenship (with regard to
employment), age forty and over, marital status, physical or mental handicap,
military service, unfavorable military discharge, and sexual orientation. Id.
103.

775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7A-102(C) (2007).

Through its investigation

process, the IDHR also determines whether there is substantial evidence that
the alleged civil rights violation occurred. Id. If there is a lack of substantial
evidence, the IDHR will dismiss the charge. Id.
104. Pub. Act No. 095-0243, available at http://www.ilga.govflegislationl
publicacts/95/095-0243.htm.
Prior to this amendatory act, an aggrieved
individual could only file a complaint with the Illinois Human Rights
Commission. Id. Now, an aggrieved individual can access Illinois circuit
courts after obtaining a notice from the IDHR similar to the EEOC's Right to
Sue letter. Id.
105. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7A-102(D)(3)(2007). If the IDHR determines
that there is no substantial evidence, the Director issues a notice to the
complainant of his or her right to seek review of the dismissal order before the
Illinois Human Rights Commission, or to file a lawsuit in an Illinois circuit
court. Id. If the complainant chooses to have the Commission review the
determination, he/she cannot later file a lawsuit. Id. If the complainant
chooses to file a lawsuit, it must be commenced within 90 days after receipt of
the determination. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Discussion supra Part I.B.2 (explaining the requirements of fact
pleading).
108. First, the new law sets up a reviewing body within the regulatory body
charged with enforcing the IHRA. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7A-102(D)(3).
Second, if a complainant seeks review of the dismissal, he/she is prevented
from later filing suit in state court. Id. Third, if the complainant files a
lawsuit after receiving a dismissal of charge notice, he/she will have to satisfy
the "fact pleading' standard which is a heightened standard. See Discussion
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employer would not be faced with defending a lawsuit through at
least the discovery phase or considering a settlement to avoid the
cost of litigation if Title VII's procedure after dismissal of a charge
mirrored that of the IHRA.109
E. Beware of the ProfessionalPlaintiff
The following excerpt is an example of the difficult position a
professional plaintiff can put an employer in:
The payroll clerk you hired a month ago has sued your business for
sexual harassment, alleging that her supervisor made unwelcome
advances. The EEOC dismissed her claim as having no reasonable
cause, but she sued anyway. Just defending the lawsuit could cost
you $50,000 in legal fees, not to mention the time and effort
required to gather evidence. If you lose, it could cost far more. The
plaintiff has offered to settle for $10,000. What should you do? 110

The professional plaintiff expects that you will settle to avoid
facing a public lawsuit; this is how they operate.
For the
workplace professional plaintiff, their job is to seek out potential
litigation through their current employment."1 "It doesn't matter
if there's a legitimate claim; the perceived threat alone is often
enough to prompt some companies to settle."112

supra Part I.B.2.
109. The transcript of debates of the House and Senate addressing the
reasons for and against House Bill 1509, which was enacted as P.A. 95-243,
focus on the fact that this legislation will provide access the courts. Audio
tape: H.R. 1509, H.R. Deb., 95th Ill. Gen. Assembly, (Apr. 17, 2007) (on file
with the author). One senator spoke out in opposition to the Bill based on the
fact that employers were against this legislation being enacted into law.
Audio tape: H.R. 1509, S.Deb., 95th Ill. Gen. Assembly, (May 22, 2007) (on file
with the author). Acknowledging that this new law permits a complainant
whose charge was dismissed access to the courts, it does not mean that the
lawsuit will survive a motion to dismiss when faced with Illinois' fact pleading
standard. Id. So, while there is a now a second bite at the apple under the
IHRA, as with Title VII, the bite may not be a sweet for the state court
plaintiff. Plus, the time and expense of litigation for the employer-defendant
will likely be less in state court because of the high probability that if the
IDHR did not find substantial evidence to support an inference of
discrimination, the plaintiff will have a difficult time passing the muster of
fact pleading. Id.
110. Steven C. Bahls, Suiting Up - Careful Screening of Job Applicants Will
Weed
Out
Professional Plaintiffs (May
1999),
available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mODTI/is 5 27/ai_54546029.
111. See id. (discussing how professional plaintiffs "threaten legal action
whenever they think there's the slightest hint of provocation that could result
in a cash settlement").
112. See id. (quoting Michael D. Karpeles, an employment attorney with
Goldberg, Kohn, Bell, Plack, Rosenbloom & Moritz, Ltd. in Chicago, Illinois.)
Karpeles further explains that professional plaintiffs change jobs frequently
with the chief intent of finding a grievance and threatening to sue. Id.
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Professional plaintiffs are difficult to track because many
agree to a quick settlement without ever filing formal charges. 113
The EEOC's own statistics evidence a growing problem of abuse in
the system. 114 While choosing to fight back could cost an employer
more money than agreeing to settle an unmeritorious claim, it can
also expose the scheme of the professional plaintiff and thwart
11 5
abuse of the system.
F. An Example of How to Level the PlayingField When it
Comes to "ProblemLitigation"
If the legal system is being abused, there are ways to curb the
abuse or at least level the playing field. Although unrelated to
Title VII litigation, certain states have enacted statutes aimed at
ceasing the filing of "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation" ("SLAPP").16 These statutes have been nicknamed
17
"Anti-SLAPP" laws.1
113. Id. People sue knowing it is cheaper for the company to settle and pay
$15,000 rather than spend $30,000 and win. Id.
114. EEOC, supra note 46.
115. See Bahls, supra note 110 (discussing the outcome of a sexual
harassment claim decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. In that case, a male loan originator for an Indianapolis mortgage
company claimed that a female loan processor he worked with exposed her
breasts to him, and made sexual advances toward him at work and over the
phone. The woman denied all of his allegations of sexual harassment. During
the lawsuit, the plaintiff produced a memo supposedly written by their branch
manager to another superior acknowledging that the harassment was going on
and suggesting that the easiest way to stop the loan originator's complaints
would be to get rid of him. The branch manager denied she wrote the memo.
During their investigation, the attorneys for the mortgage company discovered
that the plaintiff had sued three former employers. In one case, the plaintiff
produced an employment contract granting him favorable terms, bearing the
signature of an agent of the company who denied ever seeing the document.
Normally, evidence of a plaintiffs history of litigation is not admissible in a
subsequent lawsuit, however, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Indiana allowed it because it suggested the plaintiffs method of operationsuing his employers and forging incriminating documents to introduce as
evidence in the lawsuit. The district court ruled in favor of the employer, and
its decision was upheld on appeal).
116. SLAPP lawsuits allege that an injury has been caused by the efforts of
individuals or non-government organizations to influence government action
on an issue of public interest or concern. Sharon Beder, SLAPPs-Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation: Coming to a Controversy New You,
CURRENT AFFAIRS BULLETIN, Vol. 72, no. 3, Oct.-Nov. 1995, available at
http://www.uow.edu.au.arts/sts/sbeder/SLAPPS.html.
SLAPPs are filed by
one side of a public, political dispute to punish or prevent opposing points of
view. Id. One judge defines SLAPPs as being a civil court action and are suits
brought by private interests to "stop citizens from exercising their political
rights or to punish them for having done so." Id.
117. See,
e.g.,
California
Anti-SLAPP
Project,
http://www.casp.net/statutes/ca1425.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2007) (stating
"the legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in
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Anti-SLAPP laws do not prohibit an individual from filing a
lawsuit against an individual or entity. Rather, these laws raise
the bar to determine if the plaintiff has a legitimate claim. For
example, in California, plaintiffs who file a lawsuit against public
participation are subject to a special motion to strike. 118 Under
the law, a defendant who prevails on a motion to strike is entitled
to recover attorneys' fees and costs. 119 So, the playing field can be
leveled in certain types of litigation without taking away the right
to access the courts.

III.

PROPOSAL

Federal Rule 8 should be supplemented by statute to provide
for a heightened pleading standard (from notice pleading to fact
pleading), specifically for, and limited to, only those individuals
who file lawsuits pursuant to Title VII after the EEOC has
dismissed their Charge finding no reasonable cause to find a
violation of the law.

lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of constitutional rights of
freedom of speech and petition for redress of grievances"). The legislature
finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued
participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation
should not be chilled through the abuse of the judicial system. Id. To this
end, this section must be construed broadly. Other states that have enacted
Anti-SLAPP laws include Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Guan,
Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah and Washington. California
Anti-SLAPP Project, http://www.casp.net/statutes/menstate.html (last visited
Aug. 27, 2007).
118. See CAL. CIV. PROC. § 425.16(b)(1)-(3) (2005) (stating that:
a cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the
United States or California Constitution in connection with a public
issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court
determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability
that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. In making its determination,
the court shall consider the pleadings and supporting and opposing
affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based).
119. Id. In the alternative:
if the plaintiff established a probability that he or she will prevail on the
claim, neither that determination nor the fact of that determination
shall be admissible in evidence any later stage, or in any subsequent
action, and no burden of proof or degree of proof otherwise applicable
shall be affected by that determination in any later stage of the case or
in any subsequent proceeding.
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Using the FederalRules to Engage in a Fishing Expedition

Currently, Federal Rule 8 can be used by certain Title VII
plaintiffs as a fishing expedition. 120 An individual whose Charge
was dismissed by the EEOC and who then requests a "Right to
Sue" letter is saying to the Court, "I'm going to bring a lawsuit
against my employer based on mere speculation that I may have
been discriminated against, and then use the federal discovery
procedures to see whether there is any basis for my
speculation."121 Using the Rules in this manner is an example of
abusing the judicial system. Moreover, the Federal Rules do not
permit an individual to use the discovery process in order to find
122
out if he has a claim.
A Title VII plaintiff should not be allowed to see if he can
deduce a claim of discrimination against an employer after
engaging in discovery because Title VII plaintiffs have the benefit
of access to information before filing a complaint, whereas other
types of civil litigants do not. Title VII plaintiffs must file a
Charge with the EEOC and obtain a "Right to Sue" letter prior to
filing a lawsuit in federal court. 123 A Title VII plaintiff who
allowed the EEOC to complete its investigation knows whether the
EEOC concluded that the information contained in the Charge and
obtained during its investigation established a violation of Title
VII before he filed a complaint in federal court. 24 If the EEOC
determined that there was no violation of Title VII, an individual
should not then be allowed to step into federal court armed with
information other civil litigants do not have access to before filing
a lawsuit, and proceed through at least the discovery phase of
federal pre-trial procedure because of the notice pleading
standard.

120. See supra Part I.B.4 (discussing the reasons for the problem an
employer is faced with if an employee files a federal lawsuit pursuant to Title
VII after the EEOC has dismissed the Charge based on a "no reasonable
cause" finding).
121. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 61, at 31 (discussing what the
petitioner proposed to the Supreme Court after his complaint was dismissed
pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted).
122. Id. at 49 (citing 8 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller et al., Federal
Practice & Procedure § 2071, at 651 n.5 (2d ed. 1994)). "The type of fishing
which the rules do not tolerate is fishing before action to try to discover some
ground for bringing suit". Id.
123. See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing Title VII's prerequisites before filing a

lawsuit in federal court). The EEOC is charged with investigating the charge,
and then informing the parties of its determination at the conclusion of its
investigation. Id.

124. See 29 C.F.R. § 1610.7(a)(4) (2009) (providing that individuals may
obtain from the EEOC "materials in field office investigative files related to
charges under: Title VII ... ").
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B. Knowledge is Power?
A Title VII plaintiff must have a good faith basis for his claim
of discrimination prior to filing a lawsuit. 125 Knowing whether the
EEOC found a violation of Title VII prior to filing a lawsuit in
federal court can be a very powerful tool.126 Because of the low
threshold of the federal notice pleading standard, the
determination made by the EEOC is essentially rendered
meaningless.
An employer armed with the knowledge that the EEOC found
no violation of the law when it investigated a Charge does not
have the upper-hand if the individual who filed the Charge decides
to file a lawsuit. Even though the individual who filed the Charge
knows of the EEOC's determination, all he has to do is request a
"Right to Sue" letter and file a complaint against the employer
127
that simply contains a short and plain statement of the claim.
The employer will then be faced with proceeding through the
discovery phase of the pre-trial process or settling with an
undeserving plaintiff, both of which can be costly.
C. Hit the Road Jack, and Don't You Come Back Without
Facts
As evidenced above, in some circumstances, knowledge does
not equal power for an employer-defendant in a Title VII lawsuit.
Because a Title VII plaintiff who allowed the EEOC to conduct an
investigation of his Charge has access to facts and the EEOC's
findings as to the Charge, he should be not be allowed to plead his
claim under the notice pleading standard if the Charge was
dismissed based on a "no reasonable cause" finding, without more
evidence of discrimination or facts to support a prima facie case for
discrimination. 128
Rather, the prospective plaintiff should be
required to plead as follows:
1. the plaintiff must state in his complaint that the EEOC found no
129
reasonable cause for a violation of Title VII;

125. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3). This is required even if the facts upon which a
plaintiff bases his/her belief can only be alleged upon the plaintiffs own
"information and belief." Id.

126. If the EEOC determined that the employer did violate Title VII, the
plaintiff-employee would be in a better position than the defendant-employer
if a lawsuit were filed. The opposite would be true if the EEOC determined
that the information did not support a violation of the law.
127. See supra Parts I.B.l.b and II.A.2 (addressing the pleading standard of
Federal Rule 8).
128. See EEOC, supra note 46 (detailing that between FY 2001 and FY 2006,
the EEOC made a "no reasonable cause" finding approximately sixty-one
percent of the time, with respect to charges of discrimination filed under Title
VII).
129. Title VII plaintiffs are required to file a copy of the "Right to Sue" with
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2. the plaintiff must identify the cause of action in the complaint;
3. the plaintiff must identify the elements of the claim in the
complaint; and
4. the plaintiff must identify facts to support his cause of action in
30
the complaint. 1

If the plaintiff is able to satisfy the "fact pleading-like" style
described above, 131 then his complaint will proceed through the
normal federal pre-trial and trial procedure as any other
complaint would.
If, after the EEOC has dismissed the Charge, the plaintiff is
unable to show the court that he can plead the cause of action, the
elements of the complaint, and facts to support a cause of action,
then the complaint should be stricken and the defendant-employer
should be allowed to request that the court enter an award of
132
attorneys' fees and costs in its favor.
D. The Benefits of a "Hit the Road Without Facts"Mentality
Policy reasons support the notion that certain Title VII
plaintiffs should be required to plead facts from which
discrimination can be inferred in order to proceed in federal court.
First, a heightened pleading standard would reduce the
dockets of overburdened federal courts. 133 Second, it would level
the playing field between plaintiffs and defendants. 34 Third, it

the court to show that they satisfied the prerequisite to filing suit under Title
VII. See Stanley v. Ind. Civil Rights Comm'n, 557 F. Supp. 330, 333 (N.D. Ind.

1984), affd, 740 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that the action would not be
dismissed for failure to allege receipt of "Right to Sue" letter as long as
plaintiff filed letter with the court later). The author proposes that this be
taken a step further to require an individual whose charge of discrimination
was dismissed by the EEOC to plead this fact in his/her complaint.
130. See supra Part I.B.2 (describing what is required when the standard is
fact pleading).
131. The heightened pleading standard described by the author is similar to
that of Illinois' fact pleading requirement. Id.
132. See CAL. CIV. PROC. § 425.16 (providing an example of such a motion to
strike). California's Anti-SLAPP law does not prohibit an individual from
filing a lawsuit; rather, it merely raises the bar to determine if the plaintiff
has a legitimate claim. See supra Part II.F (discussing how to level the
playing field between plaintiffs and defendants).
133. See Cicero, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 758 (standing for the proposition that
overburdened federal dockets mean that years may pass before a truly
aggrieved employee is able to present a claim with merit in court).
134. This is especially important for employers who fully participate in the
EEOC's investigation which expends both time and money, only to find out
that even though the EEOC found no violation of the law, the employee filed
suit and will likely satisfy the low threshold of Federal Rule 8's "notice"
pleading standard. A level playing field in these types of cases, draws a line at
the beginning of the case rather than at the middle or end, or before an
employer has to determine if it should settle with an undeserving plaintiff.
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would provide an employer-defendant with "fair" notice of what
the plaintiff believes his claim is based on, after the EEOC has
found "no reasonable cause," thus giving defendant's more than
what they already knew. Fourth, Federal Rule 8 calls for facts
that Title VII plaintiffs have access to. 135 Fifth, not every adverse
employment action equals discrimination. 136 Finally, it may put
the "professional plaintiff' out of business, or at least caution them
that they may be required to pay an employer's attorneys' fees and
costs if they file an unmeritorious claim.
IN. CONCLUSION

Without depriving an individual of his constitutional and
statutory right to access the federal courts, creating a heightened
pleading standard for Title VII plaintiffs whose Charge was
dismissed by the EEOC for "no reasonable cause" will level the
playing field. Otherwise, this plaintiff gets another bite at the
apple in federal court, and actually has to show the court less than
what he was required to show the EEOC who dismissed the
Charge.
This second bite at the apple, without requiring a
plaintiff to show more by pleading facts, is unfair to an employer
who participated in the EEOC investigation. It also puts the
employer-defendant in a situation where it must weigh the cost of
defending a lawsuit through summary judgment to prove that it
did not in fact discriminate against the plaintiff against entering
into a settlement to save on the cost and time of litigation.

135. See supra Part II.A.2.b (explaining that because specific information

has already been provided to the EEOC, a Title VII plaintiff has access to
facts).
136. See supra Part II.C (discussing the fact that the EEOC's own statistics
prove that an
discrimination).
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